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a b s t r a c t
A hallmark of many an intuitionistic theory is the existence property, EP, i.e., if the theory
proves an existential statement then there is a provably definable witness for it. However,
there are well known exceptions, for example, the full intuitionistic Zermelo–Fraenkel set
theory, IZF, does not have the existence property, where IZF is formulated with Collection.
By contrast, the version of intuitionistic Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory formulated with
Replacement, IZFR, has the existence property. Moreover, IZF does not even enjoy aweaker
form of the existence property, wEP, defined by the slackened requirement of finding a
provably definable set of witnesses for every existential theorem. In view of these results,
one might be tempted to put the blame for the failure of the existence properties squarely
on Collection. However, in this paper it is shown that several well known intuitionistic
set theories with Collection have the weak existence property. Among these theories are
CZF−, CZFE , and CZFP , i.e., respectively, constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (CZF)
without subset Collection, CZF formulated with Exponentiation and also CZF augmented
by the Power Set axiom (basically IZFwith only bounded separation). As a result, the culprit
preventing the weak existence property from obtaining must consist of a combination of
Collection and unbounded Separation.
To bring about these results we introduce a form of realizability based on general
set recursive functions where a realizer for an existential statement provides a set of
witnesses for the existential quantifier rather than a single witness. Moreover, this notion
of realizability needs to be combined with truth to yield the desired results.
This form of realizability is also utilized, albeit shorn of its truth component, in
showing partial conservativity results for CZF−, CZFE , and CZFP over their intuitionistic
counterparts IKP, IKP(E), and IKP(P ), respectively.
As it turns out, the combination of the weak existence property and partial
conservativity of CZF− over IKP plus a further ingredient can be used to show that CZF−
actually has the existence property. The additional ingredient is an advanced technique
from proof theory (cut elimination and ordinal analysis of IKP). Roughly the same
techniques can be deployed in showing that CZFE and CZFP have the stronger existence
property, too. However, this requires a new formof ordinal analysis for theorieswith Power
Set and Exponentiation (cf. Rathjen (2011) [39]) and is beyond the scope of the current
paper.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Intuitionistic theories are known to often possess very pleasing metamathematical properties such as the disjunction
property and the numerical existence property. While it is fairly easy to establish these properties for arithmetical theories
and theories with quantification over sets of natural numbers or Baire space (e.g. second order arithmetic and function
arithmetic), set theories with their transfinite hierarchies of sets of sets and the extensionality axiom can pose considerable
technical challenges.
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Definition 1.1. Let T be a theory whose language, L(T ), encompasses the language of set theory. Moreover, for simplicity,
we shall assume that L(T ) has a constant ω denoting the set of von Neumann natural numbers and for each n a constant n¯
denoting the n-th element of ω.
1. T has the disjunction property, DP, if whenever T ⊢ B ∨ D holds for sentences B and D of T , then T ⊢ B or T ⊢ D.
2. T has the numerical existence property, NEP, if whenever T ⊢ (∃x∈ω)A(x) holds for a formula A(x) with at most the free
variable x, then T ⊢ A(n¯) for some n.
3. T has the existence property, EP, if whenever T ⊢ ∃xA(x) holds for a formula A(x) having at most the free variable x, then
there is a formula C(x)with exactly x free, so that
T ⊢ ∃!x [C(x) ∧ A(x)].
Realizability semantics are of paramount importance in the study of intuitionistic theories. They were first proposed by
Kleene [17] in 1945. Friedman [12] showed metamathematical results for intuitionistic set theories by extending a notion
of realizability developed by Kreisel and Troelstra [21]. A realizability-notion akin to Kleene’s slash [18,19] was extended
to various intuitionistic set theories by Myhill [27,28], whereby he also drew on work by Moschovakis [24]. We use IZF
to denote intuitionistic Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory formulated with Collection. [27] showed that intuitionistic ZF with
Replacement instead of Collection (dubbed IZFR henceforth) has the DP, NEP, and EP. [28] proved that his constructive set
theory CST enjoys theDP and theNEP, and that the theorywithout the axioms of countable and dependent choice, CST−, also
has the EP. It was left open in [28] whether the full existence property holds in the presence of relativized dependent choice,
RDC. Friedman and Ščedrov [15] then established that IZFR + RDC satisfies the EP also. Several systems of set theory for
the constructive mathematical practice were propounded by Friedman in [14]. The metamathematical properties of these
theories and several others as well were subsequently investigated by Beeson [5,6]. In particular, Beeson showed that IZF
has the DP and NEP. He used a combination of Kreisel–Troelstra realizability and Kleene’s [17–20] q-realizability. However,
while Myhill and Friedman developed realizability directly for extensional set theories, Beeson engineered his realizability
for non-extensional set theories and obtained results for the extensional set theories of [14] only via an interpretation in
their non-extensional counterparts. This detour had the disadvantage that in many cases (where the theory does not have
full Separation or Powerset) the DP and NEP for the corresponding extensional set theory T -ext could only be established
for a restricted class of formulae. In [33,36,37] the author of the present paper developed a different machinery for showing
the DP and the NEP (and several other properties) directly for extensional set theories. [36] introduced a self-validating
semantics for constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, CZF, that combines realizability for extensional set theory and
truth. In [37] this method was used to establish the DP and NEP for CZF and IZF augmented by familiar choice principles,
i.e., any combination of the principles of Countable Choice, Relativized Dependent Choices and the Presentation Axiom
(cf. [32]). Also Markov’s principle may be added.
So far we have not addressed the question whether the EP holds for IZF and CZF. Partial results were obtained in [35,
Theorems 8.3,8.4] to the effect that CZF augmented via a strong form of the axiom of choice, theΠΣ axiom of choice, has
the EP for a very large collection of formulae. It was shown by Friedman and Ščedrov that the EP fails for IZF, intuitionistic
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory formulated with Collection. As IZFR possesses the EP, Collection is clearly implicated in this
failure. Beeson in [6, IX.1] posed the following question:
Does any reasonable set theory with Collection have the existence property?
When investigating this problem, one is naturally led to a weaker form of the existence property, wEP, defined by the
slackened requirement of finding a provably definable set of witnesses for every existential theorem.
Definition 1.2. Let T be a theory whose language, L(T ), encompasses the language of set theory.
1. T has the weak existence property,wEP, if whenever
T ⊢ ∃xA(x)
holds for a formula A(x) having at most the free variable x, then there is a formula C(x)with exactly x free, so that
T ⊢ ∃!x C(x),
T ⊢ ∀x [C(x)→ ∃u u ∈ x],
T ⊢ ∀x [C(x)→ ∀u ∈ x A(u)].
2. We also consider a more general version ofwEP. The uniform weak existence property, uwEP, is the following property: if
T ⊢ ∀u ∃xA(u, x)
holds for a formula A(u, x) having at most the free variables u, x, then there is a formula C(u, x)with exactly u, x free, so
that
T ⊢ ∀u ∃!x C(u, x),
T ⊢ ∀u∀x [C(u, x)→ ∃z z ∈ x],
T ⊢ ∀u∀x [C(u, x)→ ∀z ∈ x A(u, z)].
Obviously, if uwEP holds for T then T has the weak existence property.
As it turns out, IZF does not satisfywEP either.
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Proposition 1.3. IZF does not have the weak existence property.
Proof. We say that IZF has the existence property for a formula ∃xA(x) if whenever IZF ⊢ ∃xA(x) then there is a formula
C(x) such that IZF ⊢ ∃!x [C(x) ∧ A(x)].
By [16, Theorem 1.1], IZF does not have the existence property for some sentence of the form
∃x [∃y D(y)→ ∃y ∈ x D(y)].
But clearly, if wEP held for IZF, then the existence property would hold for this particular sentence, contradicting
[16, Theorem 1.1]. 
The previous result shows that wEP is an interesting property. Again one might be tempted to put the blame for the
failure of this property squarely on Collection. However, in this paper it is shown that several well known intuitionistic
set theories with Collection have the weak existence property. Among these theories are constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel
set theory, CZF, formulated with Exponentiation and also CZF augmented by the Power Set axiom (basically IZF with only
bounded Separation).1 As a result, the culprit preventing the weak existence property from obtaining in the case of IZFmust
consist of a combination of Collection and unbounded Separation.
To bring about these results we introduce in Section 3 a form of realizability based on general set recursive functions
(defined in Section 2), where a realizer for an existential statement provides a set of witnesses for the existential quantifier
rather than a single witness. Moreover, this notion of realizability needs to be combined with truth to yield the desired
results.
This form of realizability is also utilized, albeit shorn of its truth component, in showing partial conservativity results in
Section 4 for CZF−, CZFE , and CZFP over their intuitionistic counterparts IKP, IKP(E), and IKP(P ), respectively.
As it turns out, the combination of the weak existence property and partial conservativity of CZF− over IKP can be used
to show that CZF− actually has the existence property. A sketch of proof is provided in Section 5. It uses methods from proof
theory (ordinal analysis). The same techniques can be deployed in showing that CZFE and CZFP have the stronger existence
property, too. However, this requires a new form of ordinal analysis for theories with Power Set and Exponentiation,
respectively. This is beyond the scope of the current paper (cf. [39]).
The traditional system of constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, CZF, has an axiom scheme called Subset Collection
(cf. [1–3]). Subset Collection implies Exponentiation and is a consequence of Power Set. It also follows from Exponentiation
with the aid of the Presentation Axiom. On the basis of the other axioms of CZF, Subset Collection is equivalent to the Fullness
Axiom which asserts that given any sets A and B there exists a set C (called full) of multi-valued functions from A to B such
that for everymulti-valued function R from A to B there exists S ⊆ Rwith S ∈ C . The statement that for any two sets the class
of multi-valued functions between them is a set is equivalent to Power Set. Proof-theoretically there is a huge gap between
Exponentiation and Power Set. The Fullness Axiom simply postulates the existence of a full set. Since in general it does not
seem possible to define a full set of multi-valued functions without assuming Powerset or choice (e.g. from ININ to IN), we
are led to surmise the following:
Conjecture. CZF does not have the weak existence property.2
1.1. The theory CZFE
In this paper we look at constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory formulated with Exponentiation, CZFE . We briefly
summarize the language and axioms of CZFE . Its language is based on the same first order language as that of classical
Zermelo–Fraenkel Set Theory, whose only non-logical symbol is ∈. The logic of CZFE is intuitionistic first order logic with
equality. Among its non-logical axioms are Extensionality, Pairing and Union in their usual forms. CZF has additionally axiom
schemata which we will now proceed to summarize.
Infinity: ∃x∀uu∈ x ↔ ∅ = u ∨ ∃v ∈ x u = v + 1where v + 1 = v ∪ {v}.
Set Induction: ∀x[∀y ∈ xA(y)→ A(x)] → ∀xA(x)
Bounded Separation: ∀a∃b∀x[x ∈ b ↔ x ∈ a ∧ A(x)]
for all bounded formulae A. A set-theoretic formula is bounded or restricted if it is constructed from prime formulae using
¬,∧,∨,→,∀x∈ y and ∃x∈ y only.
Strong Collection: For all formulae A,
∀a∀x ∈ a∃yA(x, y) → ∃b [∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ b A(x, y) ∧ ∀y ∈ b ∃x ∈ a A(x, y)].
1 Burr [7, Corollary 5.12] and Diller [10, Proposition 4.4] proved weak forms of term existence property for a higher type versions of CZFwithout Subset
Collection and Exponentiation.
2 Added in proof: This has recently be proved by A. Swan.
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Exponentiation: Let Fun(f , a, b) be the set-theoretic formula expressing that f is a function from the set a to the set b.
∀a∀b∃c ∀f (Fun(f , a, b)→ f ∈ c).
We shall also study the theory augmented by the Power Set Axiom, Pow:
∀x ∃y∀z (z ⊆ y → z ∈ y).
We denote the system with Pow added by CZFP rather than CZFE + Pow. The reason for this is that both Exponentiation
and Subset Collection are consequences of Pow (see [2, Proposition 7.2]).
To save work when proving realizability of the axioms of CZFE it is useful to know that the axiom scheme of Bounded
Separation can be deduced from a single instance (in the presence of Strong Collection).
Lemma 1.4. Let Binary Intersection be the statement ∀x∀y∃z x ∩ y = z. If CZF0 denotes CZFE without Bounded Separation
and Exponentiation, then every instance of Bounded Separation is provable in CZF0 + Binary Intersection.
Proof. [2, Proposition 4.8] is a forerunner of this result. It is proved in the above form in [3, Corollary 9.5.7]. 
2. Intuitionistic Kripke–Platek set theories
A particularly interesting (classical) subtheory of ZF is Kripke–Platek set theory, KP. Its standard models are called
admissible sets. One of the reasons that this is an important theory is that a great deal of set theory requires only the axioms of
KP. An even more important reason is that admissible sets have been a major source of interaction between model theory,
recursion theory and set theory (cf. [4]). KP arises from ZF by completely omitting the power set axiom and restricting
separation and collection to bounded formulae. These alterations are suggested by the informal notion of ‘predicative’. To
be more precise, the axioms of KP consist of Extensionality, Pair, Union, Infinity, Bounded Separation
∃x∀u [u ∈ x ↔ (u ∈ a ∧ A(u))]
for all bounded formulae A(u), Bounded Collection
∀x ∈ a ∃y B(x, y) → ∃z ∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ z B(x, y)
for all bounded formulae B(x, y), and Set Induction
∀x [(∀y ∈ x C(y))→ C(x)] → ∀x C(x)
for all formulae C(x).
We denote by IKP the version of KPwhere the underlying logic is intuitionistic logic.
2.1. Power and Exponentiation Kripke–Platek set theory
Weuse subset bounded quantifiers ∃x ⊆ y . . . and∀x ⊆ y . . . as abbreviations for ∃x(x ⊆ y ∧ . . .) and∀x(x ⊆ y → . . .),
respectively.
We call a formula ofL∈ ∆P0 if all its quantifiers are of the form Q x ⊆ y or Q x∈ywhere Q is ∀ or ∃ and x and y are distinct
variables.
Let Fun(f , x, y) be a acronym for the bounded formula expressing that f is a function with domain x and co-domain y.
We use Exponentiation bounded quantifiers ∃f ∈ xy . . . and ∀f ∈ xy . . . as abbreviations for ∃f (Fun(f , x, y) ∧ . . .) and
∀x(Fun(f , x, y)→ . . .), respectively.
Definition 2.1. The∆P0 formulae are the smallest class of formulae containing the atomic formulae closedunder∧,∨,→,¬
and the quantifiers
∀x ∈ a, ∃x ∈ a, ∀x ⊆ a, ∃x ⊆ a.
The ∆E0 formulae are the smallest class of formulae containing the atomic formulae closed under ∧,∨,→,¬ and the
quantifiers
∀x ∈ a, ∃x ∈ a, ∀f ∈ ab, ∃f ∈ ab.
Definition 2.2. IKP(E) has the same language and logic as IKP. Its axioms are the following: Extensionality, Pairing, Union,
Infinity, Exponentiation,∆E0 -Separation and∆
E
0 -Collection.
IKP(P ) has the same language and logic as IKP. Its axioms are the following: Extensionality, Pairing, Union, Infinity,
Powerset,∆P0 -Separation and∆
P
0 -Collection.
The transitive classical models of IKP(P ) have been termed power admissible sets in [13].
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Remark 2.3. Alternatively, IKP(P ) can be obtained from IKP by adding a function symbolP for the powerset function as a
primitive symbols to the language and the axiom
∀y [y ∈ P (x)↔ y ⊆ x]
and extending the schemes of∆0 Separation and Collection to the∆0 formulae of this new language.
Likewise, IKP(E) can be obtained from IKP by adding a primitive function symbol E for the Exponentiation and the
pertaining axioms.
Lemma 2.4. (i) IKP is a subtheory of CZF−.
(ii) IKP(E) is a subtheory of CZFE .
(iii) IKP(P ) is a subtheory of CZFP .
Proof. (i) is obvious. For (ii) one has to show that CZFE proves ∆E0 -Separation. This follows by induction on the buildup of
the∆E0 -formula. Similarly, for (iii) one has to show that CZFP proves∆
P
0 -Separation. 
Definition 2.5. The Σ formulae are the smallest class of formulae containing the ∆0-formulae closed under ∧,∨ and the
quantifiers
∀x ∈ a, ∃x ∈ a, ∃x.
TheΣE formulae are the smallest class of formulae containing the∆E0 -formulae closed under ∧,∨ and the quantifiers
∀x ∈ a, ∃x ∈ a, ∀f ∈ ab, ∃f ∈ ab, ∃x.
TheΣP formulae are the smallest class of formulae containing the∆P0 -formulae closed under ∧,∨ and the quantifiers
∀x ∈ a, ∃x ∈ a, ∀x ⊆ a, ∃x ⊆ a, ∃x.
To be able to formalize the notion of E-recursion in IKP as well as the corresponding extensions in IKP(E) and IKP(P ),
we need to know that certain (class) inductive definitions can be formalized in these theories.
Definition 2.6. An inductive definition Φ is a class of pairs. Intuitively an inductive definition is an abstract proof system,
where ⟨x, A⟩ ∈ Φ means that A is a set of premises and x is aΦ-consequence of these premises.
Φ is aΣ inductive definition ifΦ is aΣ definable class.Φ isΣE (ΣP ) ifΦ is aΣE (ΣP ) definable class.
A class X is said to beΦ-closed if A ⊆ X implies a ∈ X for every pair ⟨a, A⟩ ∈ Φ .
Theorem 2.7. (IKP) For any Σ inductive definition Φ there is a smallest Φ-closed class I(Φ); moreover, I(Φ) is a Σ class as
well.
Proof. [2, Theorem 11.4] and [23]. 
Theorem 2.8. (i) (IKP(E)) For anyΣE inductive definition Φ there is a smallest Φ-closed class I(Φ); moreover, I(Φ) is aΣE
class as well.
(ii) (IKP(P )) For anyΣP inductive definitionΦ there is a smallestΦ-closed class I(Φ); moreover, I(Φ) is aΣP class as well.
Proof. Basically the same proof as for Theorem 2.7. 
2.2. E-recursive functions
We would like to have unlimited application of sets to sets, i.e. we would like to assign a meaning to the symbol {a}(x)
where a and x are sets. Here we use Kleene’s curly bracket notation to convey that a is viewed as encoding the programme
of some kind of Turing machine which takes a set input x to produce a result {a}(x). In generalized recursion theory this
is known as E-recursion or set recursion (see, e.g., [29] or [40, Ch.X]). One point of deviation from the standard notion of
E-computability though is that we will take the constant function with valueω as an initial function. There is a lot of leeway
in setting up E-recursion. The particular schemes we use are especially germane to our situation. Very likely there is a lot of
redundancy but any attempts at being economical would not have any benefits for the purposes of this paper.
Our construction will provide a specific set-theoretic model for the elementary theory of operations and numbers EON
(see, e.g., [6, VI.2], or the theory APP as described in [43, Ch.9, Sect.3]). We utilize encoding of finite sequences of sets by the
usual pairing function ⟨ , ⟩ with ⟨x, y⟩ = {{x}, {x, y}}, letting ⟨x⟩ = x and ⟨x1, . . . , xn, xn+1⟩ = ⟨⟨x1, . . . , xn⟩, xn+1⟩. We use
functions ()0 and ()1 to retrieve the left and right components, respectively, of an ordered pair a = ⟨x, y⟩, i.e., (a)0 = x and
(a)1 = y.
Below we use the notation [ x ](y) rather than the more traditional {x}(y) to avoid any ambiguity with the singleton set
{x}.
It will also be convenient to assume that all systems of set theory are formulated in a language that has a constant n¯ for
each n ∈ N plus the pertaining axiom asserting that n¯ is the nth member of ω.
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Definition 2.9 (IKP). First, we select distinct non-zero natural numbers k, s, p, p0, p1, sN, pN, dN, 0¯, ω¯, γ , ρ, υ, π, i1, i2 and
i3, which will provide indices for special E-recursive partial (class) functions. Inductively we shall define a class E of triples
⟨e, x, y⟩. Rather than ‘‘⟨e, x, y⟩ ∈ E", we shall write ‘‘[ e ](x) ≃ y", and moreover, if n > 0, we shall use [ e ](x1, . . . , xn) ≃ y
to convey that
[ e ](x1) ≃ ⟨e, x1⟩ ∧ [ ⟨e, x1⟩ ](x2) ≃ ⟨e, x1, x2⟩ ∧ . . . ∧ [ ⟨e, x1, . . . , xn−1⟩ ](xn) ≃ y.
We shall say that [ e ](x) is defined, written [ e ](x) ↓, if [ e ](x) ≃ y for some y. Let N := ω. E is defined by the following
clauses:
[ k ](x, y) ≃ x
[ s ](x, y, z) ≃ [ [ x ](z) ]([ y ](z))
[ p ](x, y) ≃ ⟨x, y⟩
[ p0 ](x) ≃ (x)0
[ p1 ](x) ≃ (x)1
[ sN ](n) ≃ n+ 1 if n ∈ N
[ pN ](0) ≃ 0
[ pN ](n+ 1) ≃ n if n ∈ N
[ dN ](n,m, x, y) ≃ x if n,m ∈ N and n = m
[ dN ](n,m, x, y) ≃ y if n,m ∈ N and n ≠ m
[ 0¯ ](x) ≃ 0
[ ω¯ ](x) ≃ ω
[π ](x, y) ≃ {x, y}
[υ ](x) ≃  x
[ γ ](x, y) ≃ x ∩ ( y)
[ ρ ](x, y) ≃ {[ x ](u) | u ∈ y} if [ x ](u) is defined for all u ∈ y
[ i1 ](x, y, z) ≃ {u ∈ x | y ∈ z}
[ i2 ](x, y, z) ≃ {u ∈ x | u ∈ y → u ∈ z}
[ i3 ](x, y, z) ≃ {u ∈ x | u ∈ y → z ∈ u}.
Note that [ s ](x, y, z) is not defined unless [ x ](z), [ y ](z) and [ [ x ](z) ]([ y ](z)) are already defined. The clause for s is thus
to be read as a conjunction of the following clauses: [ s ](x) ≃ ⟨s, x⟩, [ ⟨s, x⟩ ](y) ≃ ⟨s, x, y⟩ and, if there exist a, b, c such
that [ x ](z) ≃ a, [ y ](z) ≃ b, [ a ](b) ≃ c , then [ ⟨s, x, y⟩ ](z) ≃ c. Similar restrictions apply to ρ.
Lemma 2.10 (IKP). E is an inductively defined class and E is functional in that for all e, x, y, y′,
⟨e, x, y⟩ ∈ E ∧ ⟨e, x, y′⟩ ∈ E ⇒ y = y′.
Proof. The inductive definition of E falls under the heading of Theorem 2.8. If [ e ](x) ≃ y the uniqueness of y follows by
induction on the stages (cf. [2, Lemma 5.2]) of that inductive definition. 
Definition 2.11. Application terms are defined inductively as follows:
(i) The constants k, s, p, p0, p1, sN, pN, dN, 0¯, ω¯, γ , ρ, υ, π, i1, i2 and i3 singled out in Definition 2.9 are application terms;
(ii) variables are application terms;
(iii) if s and t are application terms then (st) is an application term.
Definition 2.12. Application terms are easily formalized in IKP. However, rather than translating application terms into the
set-theoretic language, we define the translation of expressions of the form t ≃ u, where t is an application term and u is a
variable. The translation proceeds along the way t was built up:
[c ≃ u]∧ is c = u if c is a constant or a variable;
[(st) ≃ u]∧ is ∃x∃y([s ≃ x]∧ ∧ [t ≃ y]∧ ∧ [ x ](y) ≃ u).
Abbreviations. For application terms s, t , t1, . . . , tn we will use:
s(t1, . . . , tn) as a shortcut for ((. . . (st1) . . .)tn); (parentheses associated to the left);
st1 . . . tn as a shortcut for s(t1, . . . , tn);
t↓ as a shortcut for ∃x(t ≃ x)∧; (t is defined)
(s ≃ t)∧ as a shortcut for ( s↓ ∨ t↓) → ∃x((s ≃ x)∧ ∧ (t ≃ x)∧).
1406 M. Rathjen / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 1400–1418
A closed application term is an application term that does not contain variables. If t is a closed application term and
a1, . . . , an, b are sets we use the abbreviation
t(a1, . . . , an) ≃ b for ∃x1 . . . xn∃y

x1 = a1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn = an ∧ y = b
∧ [t(x1, . . . , xn) ≃ y]∧

.
Definition 2.13. Every closed application term gives rise to a partial class function. A partial n-place (class) function Υ is
said to be an Eexp-recursive partial function if there exists a closed application term tΥ such that
dom(Υ ) = {(a1, . . . , an) | tΥ (a1, . . . , an) ↓}
and for all sets (a1, . . . , an) ∈ dom(Υ ),
tΥ (a1, . . . , an) ≃ Υ (a1, . . . , an).
In the latter case, tΥ is said to be an index for Υ .
If Υ1,Υ2 are Eexp-recursive partial functions, then Υ1(a⃗) ≃ Υ2(a⃗) iff neither Υ1(a⃗) nor Υ2(a⃗) are defined, or Υ1(a⃗) and
Υ2(a⃗) are defined and equal.
The next two results can be proved in the theory APP and thus hold true in any applicative structure. Thence the particular
applicative structure considered here satisfies the Abstraction Lemma and Recursion Theorem (see e.g. [11] or [6]).
Lemma 2.14 (Abstraction Lemma, cf. [6, VI.2.2]). For every application term t[x] there exists an application term λx.t[x] with
FV(λx.t[x]) := {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ FV(t[x])\{x} such that the following holds:
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(λx.t[x]↓ ∧ ∀y (λx.t[x])y ≃ t[y]).
Proof. (i) λx.x is skk; (ii) λx.t is kt for t a constant or a variable other than x; (iii) λx.uv is

s(λx.u)

(λx.v). 
Lemma 2.15 (Recursion Theorem, cf. [6, VI.2.7]). There exists a closed application term rec such that for any f , x,
recf ↓ ∧ recfx ≃ f (recf )x.
Proof. Take rec to be λf .tt , where t is λyλx.f (yy)x. 
2.3. Extended E-recursive functions
We shall introduce two extended notions of E-computability, christened Eexp-computability and E℘-computability,
rendering the functions exp(a, b) = ab and P (x) = {u | u ⊆ x} computable, respectively (where ab denotes the set
of all functions from a to b). Indices for these functions will supply suitable for realizability interpretations of CZFE and
CZFP , respectively.
E℘-computability is closely related to power recursion,where the power set operation is regarded to be an initial function.
The latter notion has been studied by Moschovakis [25] and Moss [26].
Definition 2.16. (i) (IKP(E)) For Eexp-computability we add an additional constant ε and the clause
[ ε ](x, y) ≃ xy
to Definition 2.9. We thereby arrive at an inductively defined class Eexp .
(ii) (IKP(P )) For E℘-computability we add an additional constant ℘¯ and the clause
[ ℘¯ ](x) ≃ P (x)
to Definition 2.9. We thereby arrive at an inductively defined class E℘ .
Lemma 2.17. (i) (IKP(E)) Eexp is an inductively defined class and Eexp is functional in that for all e, x, y, y′,
⟨e, x, y⟩ ∈ Eexp ∧ ⟨e, x, y′⟩ ∈ Eexp ⇒ y = y′.
(ii) (IKP(P )) E℘ is an inductively defined class and E℘ is functional in that for all e, x, y, y′,
⟨e, x, y⟩ ∈ E℘ ∧ ⟨e, x, y′⟩ ∈ E℘ ⇒ y = y′.
Proof. The same procedure as for Lemma 2.10. 
There is of course a notion of application term pertaining to Eexp and another one pertaining to E℘ . Constants ε and ℘¯,
respectively, have to be added in Definition 2.11. We call them ε-application terms and ℘-applications terms, respectively.
All the previous results then hold, grosso modo, for the two expanded notions of application term. In particular one has the
following results.
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Corollary 2.18. For any Eexp-recursive partial functionΥ there exists a closed ε-application term τfix such that τfix ↓ and for all a⃗,
Υ (e¯, a⃗) ≃ τfix(a⃗),
where τfix ≃ e¯. Moreover, τfix can be effectively (e.g. primitive recursively) constructed from an index for Υ .
Corollary 2.19. For any E℘-recursive partial function Υ there exists a closed ℘¯-application term τfix such that τfix ↓ and for all a⃗,
Υ (e¯, a⃗) ≃ τfix(a⃗),
where τfix ≃ e¯. Moreover, τfix can be effectively (e.g. primitive recursively) constructed from an index for Υ .
Lemma 2.20. For each ∆0 formula A(a⃗, u) formula (with a all free variables among a⃗, u) there is a closed application term tA
such that
IKP ⊢ tA(a⃗, b) ↓ ∧∀u [u ∈ tA(a⃗, b) ↔ (u ∈ b ∧ A(a⃗, u))].
Proof. We use induction on the generation of A(a⃗, u). Owing to extensionality it suffices to show this for formulae that do
not contain=.
1. Let A(a⃗, u) be atomic. First suppose that A(a⃗, u) is of the form u ∈ ai. Then {u ∈ b | A(a⃗, u)} = ai ∩ b. Let
tA := λx⃗y.γ(xi,π(y, y)). Then tA(a⃗, b) = γ(ai,π(b, b)) = ai ∩ ({b}) = ai ∩ b.
Now suppose A(a⃗, u) is of the form ai ∈ u. Then {u ∈ b | A(a⃗, u)} = {u ∈ b | u ∈ b → ai ∈ u}. Thus tA := λx⃗y.i3(y, y, xi)
will do the job.
The other cases are where A(a⃗, u) is of either form u ∈ u or ai ∈ aj. Here the terms λx⃗y.0y and λx⃗y.i1(y, xi, xj)will work.
2. If A(a⃗, u) is of the form A1(a⃗, u) ∨ A2(a⃗, u) let tA := λx⃗y.υ(π(tA1(x⃗, y), tA2(x⃗, y))). This works since tA(a⃗, b) ={tA1(a⃗, b), tA2(a⃗, b)} = tA1(a⃗, b) ∪ tA2(a⃗, b).
3. If A(a⃗, u) is of the form A1(a⃗, u) ∧ A2(a⃗, u) let tA := λx⃗y.γ(tA1(x⃗, y),π(tA2(x⃗, y), tA2(x⃗, y))). This works as tA(a⃗, b) =
tA1(a⃗, b) ∩
{tA2(a⃗, b)} = tA1(a⃗, b) ∩ tA2(a⃗, b).
4. If A(a⃗, u) is of the form A1(a⃗, u) → A2(a⃗, u) put tA := λx⃗y.i2(y, tA1(x⃗, y), tA2(x⃗, y)) since tA(a⃗, b) = {u ∈ b | u ∈
tA1(x⃗, y)→ u ∈ tA2(x⃗, y)}.
5. If A(a⃗, u) is of the form ¬A1(a⃗, u) put tA := λx⃗y.i2(y, tA1(x⃗, y), 0(y)) since tA(a⃗, b) = {u ∈ b | u ∈ tA1(x⃗, y)→ u ∈ ∅}.
6. Suppose A(a⃗, u) is of the form ∀w ∈ ai B(a⃗, w, u). Inductively we have a term tB such that tB(a⃗, d, b) = {u ∈ b | B(a⃗, d, u)}.
Thus, letting tA := λx⃗y.γ(y, ρ(λz.tB(x⃗, z, y), xi)), we have
tA(a⃗, b) = γ(b, ρ(λz.tB(a⃗, z, b), ai)) = b ∩

{tB(a⃗, d, b) | d ∈ ai}
= b ∩

{{u ∈ b | B(a⃗, d, u)} | d ∈ ai} = {u ∈ b | ∀w ∈ ai B(a⃗, w, u)}.
If A(a⃗, u) is of the form ∀w ∈ u B(a⃗, w, u), we have
{u ∈ b | ∀w ∈ u B(a⃗, w, u)} =

u ∈ b | ∀w ∈

b (w ∈ u → B(a⃗, w, u))

,
and hence this case can be reduced to the previous with the help of (4).
7. Suppose A(a⃗, u) is of the form ∃w ∈ ai B(a⃗, w, u). Inductively we have a term tB such that tB(a⃗, d, b) = {u ∈ b | B(a⃗, d, u)}.
Let tA := λx⃗y.υ(ρ(λz.tB(x⃗, z, y), xi)), we have
tA(a⃗, b) = υ(ρ(λz.tB(a⃗, z, b), ai)) =

{tB(a⃗, d, b) | d ∈ ai}
=

{{u ∈ b | B(a⃗, d, u)} | d ∈ ai} = {u ∈ b | ∃w ∈ ai B(a⃗, w, u)}.
If A(a⃗, u) is of the form ∃w ∈ u B(a⃗, w, u), we have
{u ∈ b | ∃w ∈ u B(a⃗, w, u)} =

u ∈ b | ∃w ∈

b (w ∈ u ∧ B(a⃗, w, u))

,
so that this case can be reduced to the previous with the help of (3). 
Lemma 2.21. (i) For each∆E0 formula A(a⃗, u) formula (with a all free variables among a⃗, u) there is a closed ε-application term
tA such that
IKP(E) ⊢ tA(a⃗, b) ↓ ∧∀u [u ∈ tA(a⃗, b) ↔ (u ∈ b ∧ A(a⃗, u))].
(ii) For each∆P0 formula A(a⃗, u) formula (with a all free variables among a⃗, u) there is a closed ℘¯-application term tA such that
IKP(P ) ⊢ tA(a⃗, b) ↓ ∧∀u [u ∈ tA(a⃗, b) ↔ (u ∈ b ∧ A(a⃗, u))].
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Proof. The proof expands that of Lemma 2.20. For instance, in (ii) A(a⃗, u) could be of the form ∀w ⊆ ai B(a⃗, w, u).
Then, inductively we have a term tB such that tB(a⃗, d, b) = {u ∈ b | B(a⃗, d, u)}. Thus, letting tA := λx⃗y.γ(y, ρ(λz.tB
(x⃗, z, y), ℘¯(xi))), we have
tA(a⃗, b) = γ(b, ρ(λz.tB(a⃗, z, b), ℘¯(ai))) = b ∩

{tB(a⃗, d, b) | d ∈ P (ai)}
= b ∩

{{u ∈ b | B(a⃗, d, u)} | d ∈ P (ai)} = {u ∈ b | ∀w ⊆ ai B(a⃗, w, u)}.
If A(a⃗, u) is of the form ∀w ⊆ u B(a⃗, w, u), we have
{u ∈ b | ∀w ⊆ u B(a⃗, w, u)} =

u ∈ b | ∀w ⊆

b (w ⊆ u → B(a⃗, w, u))

,
and hence this case can be reduced to the previous one.
The other cases are similar. 
3. Defining realizability with sets of witnesses for set theory
Realizability semantics are a crucial tool in the study of intuitionistic theories. We introduce a form of realizability based
on general set recursive functions where a realizer for an existential statement provides a set of witnesses for the existential
quantifier rather than a single witness. Realizability based on indices of general set recursive functions was introduced in
[34] and employed to prove, inter alia, metamathematical properties for CZF augmented by strong forms of the axiom of
choice in [35, Theorems 8.3,8.4]. There are points of contact with a notion of realizability used by Tharp [42] who employed
(indices of) Σ1 definable partial (class) functions as realizers, though there are important differences, too, as Tharp works
in a classical context and assumes a definable search operation on the universe which basically amounts to working under
the hypothesis V = L. Moreover, there are connections with Lifschitz’ realizability [22] where a realizer for an existential
arithmetical statement provides a finite co-recursive set of witnesses (see [30,8] for extensions to analysis and set theory).
Another important type of semantics or interpretation for intuitionistic systems is functional interpretation. The Diller–
Nahm interpretation [9] also employs sets of witnesses to interpret existential quantifiers. It has been extended to set
theories by Burr, Diller and Schulte [7,10,41]. Burr [7, Corollary 5.12] and Diller [10, Proposition 4.4] prove weak forms
of term existence property for a higher type versions of CZF−. Interestingly, Diller conjectures ([10] Conjectures 4.8,4.9) that
the term existence property fails for higher type versions of CZF−. By contrast, in this paper it shown that CZF− does have
the existence property (Corollary 6.1).
A further important aspect of our realizability is that it is combined with truth so that realizability entails truth and
thereby yields the desired results.
We adopt the conventions and notations from the previous section. However, we prefer to write ȷ0e and ȷ1e rather than
(e)0 and (e)1, respectively, and instead of [ a ](b) ≃ c we shall write a • b ≃ c.
Definition 3.1. Bounded quantifiers will be treated as quantifiers in their own right, i.e., bounded and unbounded
quantifiers are treated as syntactically different kinds of quantifiers.
We use the expression a ≠ ∅ to convey the positive fact that the set a is inhabited, that is ∃x x ∈ a.
We define a relation a wt B between sets and set-theoretic formulae. a • f wt B will be an abbreviation for
∃x[a • f ≃ x ∧ x wt B].
a wt A iff A holds true, whenever A is an atomic formula
a wt A ∧ B iff ȷ0a wt A ∧ ȷ1a wt B
a wt A ∨ B iff a ≠ ∅ ∧ (∀d ∈ a)(

ȷ0d = 0 ∧ ȷ1d wt A
 ∨ ȷ0d = 1 ∧ ȷ1d wt B)
a wt ¬A iff ¬A ∧ ∀c ¬c wt A
a wt A → B iff (A → B) ∧ ∀c

c wt A → a • c wt B

a wt (∀x ∈ b) A iff (∀c ∈ b) a • c wt A[x/c]
a wt (∃x ∈ b) A iff a ≠ ∅ ∧ (∀d ∈ a)[ȷ0d ∈ b ∧ ȷ1d wt A[x/ȷ0d]
a wt ∀xA iff ∀c a • c wt A[x/c]
a wt ∃xA iff a ≠ ∅ ∧ (∀d ∈ a) ȷ1d wt A[x/ȷ0d]
wt B iff ∃a a wt B.
The preceding realizability notion is based on E-computability, i.e., e • x ≃ y stands for ⟨e, x, y⟩ ∈ E. If instead we use the
corresponding realizability notion based on Eexp–computability, where e • x ≃ y stands for ⟨e, x, y⟩ ∈ Eexp , we notate this
by writing e εwt B. In the same vein, realizability based on E℘–computability with e • x ≃ y standing for ⟨e, x, y⟩ ∈ E℘ , will
be indicated by e ℘wt ψ .
Remark 3.2. The above notion of realizability stripped of its truth component was employed in [38] to obtain proof-
theoretic results relating intuitionistic and classical set theories.
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Corollary 3.3. (i) CZF− ⊢ (wt B)→ B.
(ii) CZFE ⊢ (εwt B)→ B.
(iii) CZFP ⊢ (℘wt B)→ B.
Proof. This is immediate by induction on the complexity of B. 
Lemma 3.4. Let x⃗ = x1, . . . , xr and a⃗ = a1, . . . , ar . To each formula A(x⃗) of set theory (with all free variables among x⃗) we can
effectively assign (a code of) an E-recursive partial function χA such that the following hold:
(i) CZF− ⊢ ∀a⃗∀c ≠ ∅ [ (∀d ∈ c d wt A(a⃗))→ χA(a⃗, c) wt A(a⃗)].
(ii) CZFE ⊢ ∀a⃗∀c ≠ ∅ [ (∀d ∈ c d εwt A(a⃗))→ χA(a⃗, c) εwt A(a⃗)].
(iii) CZFP ⊢ ∀a⃗∀c ≠ ∅ [ (∀d ∈ c d ℘wt A(a⃗))→ χA(a⃗, c) ℘wt A(a⃗)].
Proof. We prove (i). (ii) and (iii) are almost identical. We use induction on the buildup of A.
If A is atomic, let χA(a⃗, c) := 0.
Let A(x⃗) be B(x⃗) ∧ C(x⃗) and χB and χC be already defined. Then
χA(a⃗, c) := ȷ(χB(a⃗, {ȷ0x | x ∈ c}), χC (a⃗, {ȷ1x | x ∈ c}))
will do the job.
Let A(x⃗) be B(x⃗) → C(x⃗) and suppose χB and χC have already been defined. Assume that c ≠ ∅ and (∀d ∈ c) d wt
[B(a⃗)→ C(a⃗)]. Suppose e wt B(a⃗). Define the E-recursive partial function ϑ by
ϑ(c, e) ≃ {d • e | d ∈ c}.
Then ϑ(c, e) ≠ ∅ and hence, by the inductive assumption, χC (a⃗, ϑ(c, e)) wt C(a⃗ ), so that
λe.χC (a⃗, ϑ(c, e)) wt A(a⃗ ).
Now let A(x⃗ ) be of the form ∀y B(x⃗, y). Suppose that c ≠ ∅ and (∀d ∈ c) d wt A(a⃗ ). Fixing b, we then have (∀d ∈
c) d•b wt B(a⃗, b), thus, ∀d′ ∈ ϑ(c, b) d′ wt B(a⃗, b), and therefore, by the inductive assumption, χB(a⃗, ϑ(c, b)) wt B(a⃗, b).
As a result
λb.χB(a⃗, ϑ(c, b)) wt A(a⃗ ).
The case of A(x⃗ ) starting with a bounded universal quantifier is similar to the previous case.
In all the remaining cases, χA(a⃗, c) := c will work owing to the definition of realizability in these cases. 
Lemma 3.5 (IKP). Realizers for equality laws:
(i) 0 wt x = x.
(ii) λu.u wt x = y → y = x.
(iii) λu.u wt (x = y ∧ y = z) → x = z.
(iv) λu.u wt (x = y ∧ y ∈ z) → x ∈ z.
(v) λu.u wt (x = y ∧ z ∈ x) → z ∈ y.
(vi) λu.ȷ1u wt (x = y ∧ A(x))→ A(y)
for any formula A.
Proof. (i)–(v) are obvious. (vi) follows by a trivial induction on the buildup of A. 
Lemma 3.6 (IKP). Realizers for logical axioms: Below we use the E-recursive function sg(a) := {a}.
(IPL1) k wt A → (B → A).
(IPL2) s wt [A → (B → C)] → [(A → B)→ (A → C)].
(IPL3) λe.λd.ȷ(e, d)⟩ wt A → (B → A ∧ B).
(IPL4) λe.ȷ0e wt A ∧ B → A.
(IPL5) λe.ȷ1e wt A ∧ B → B.
(IPL6) λe.sg(ȷ(0, e)) wt A → A ∨ B.
(IPL7) λe.sg(ȷ(1, e))⟩ wt B → A ∨ B.
(IPL8) k(a⃗ ) wt (A ∨ B)→ [(A → C)→ ((B → C)→ C)], for some Eexp-recursive partial function k, where a⃗ comprises all
parameters appearing in the formula.
(IPL9) λe.λd.0 wt (A → B)→ ((A → ¬B)→ ¬A).
(IPL10) λe.0 wt A → (¬A → B).
(IPL11) λe.e • b wt ∀xA(x)→ A(b).
(IPL12) λe.sg(e) wt A(a)→ ∃xA(x).
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Proof. As for IPL1 and IPL2, this justifies the combinators s and k. Combinatory completeness of these two combinators is
equivalent to the fact that these two laws together with modus ponens generate the full set of theorems of propositional
implicational intuitionistic logic.
Except for IPL8, one easily checks that the proposed realizers indeed realize the pertaining formulae.
So let us check IPL8. A ∨ B → ((A → C) → ((B → C) → C)). Suppose e wt A ∨ B. Then e ≠ ∅. Let d ∈ e. Then
ȷ0d = 0 ∧ ȷ1d wt A or ȷ0d = 1 ∧ ȷ1d wt B. Suppose f wt A → C and g wt B → C . Define an Eexp-recursive partial
function f by
f(d′, f ′, g ′) = [dN](ȷ0d′, 0, f ′ • (ȷ1d′), g ′ • (ȷ1d′)).
Then
f(d′, f ′, g ′) =

f ′ • (ȷ1d′) if ȷ0d′ = 0
g ′ • (ȷ1d′) if ȷ0d′ = 1.
As a result, f(d, f , g) wt C and hence λf .λg.f(d, f , g) wt (A → C)→ ((B → C)→ C). Thus, [ρ](λd.λf .λg.f(d, f , g), e) ≠
∅ and for all p ∈ [ρ](λd.λf .λg.f(d, f , g), e)we have
p wt (A → C)→ ((B → C)→ C).
Let E(a⃗ ) := (A → C) → ((B → C) → C), where a⃗ comprises all parameters appearing in the formula on the right hand
side. The upshot is that by Lemma 3.4 we can conclude
χE(a⃗, [ρ](λd.λf .λg.f(d, f , g), e)) wt E(a⃗ ).
And consequently we have
λe.χE(a⃗, [ρ](λd.λf .λg.f(d, f , g), e)) wt A ∨ B → E(a⃗ ). 
Theorem 3.7. Let D(u1, . . . , ur) be a formula ofL∈ all of whose free variables are among u1, . . . , ur . If
CZF− ⊢ D(u1, . . . , ur),
then one can effectively construct an index of an E-recursive function g such that
CZF− ⊢ ∀a1, . . . , ar g(a1, . . . , ar) wt D(a1, . . . , ar).
Proof. We use a standard Hilbert-type systems for intuitionistic predicate logic. The proof proceeds by induction on the
derivation. For the logical axioms and the equality axioms we have already produced appropriate Eexp-recursive functions
in Lemmata 3.5 and 3.6. It remains to deal with logical inferences and set-theoretic axioms. We start with the rules.
The only rule from propositional logic is modus ponens. Suppose that we have E-recursive functions g0 and g1 such
that for all a⃗, g0(a⃗ ) wt A(a⃗ ) → B(a⃗ ) and g1(a⃗ ) wt A(a⃗ ). Then g(a⃗ ) wt B(a⃗ ) holds with the E-recursive function
g(a⃗ ) := g0(a⃗ ) • g1(a⃗ ).
For the ∀ quantifier we have the rule: from B(u⃗)→ A(x, u⃗) infer B(u⃗)→ ∀xA(x, u⃗) if x is not free in B(u⃗). Inductively we
have an E-recursive function h such that for all b, a⃗,
h(b, a⃗ ) wt B(a⃗)→ A(b, a⃗).
Suppose d wt B(a⃗). Then h(b, a⃗ ) • d wt A(b, a⃗) holds for all b, whence λx.(h(x, a⃗ ) • d) wt ∀xA(x, a⃗). As a result,
λd.λx.(h(x, a⃗ ) • d) wt B(a⃗)→ ∀xA(x, a⃗).
For the ∃ quantifier we have the rule: from A(x, u⃗) → B(u⃗) infer ∃x A(x, u⃗) → B(u⃗) if x is not free in B(u⃗). Inductively we
then have an E-recursive function g such that for all b, a⃗,
g(b, a⃗ ) wt A(b, a⃗)→ B(a⃗).
Suppose e wt ∃xA(x, a⃗). Then e ≠ ∅ and for all d ∈ e, ȷ1d wt A(ȷ0d, a⃗). Consequently, (∀d ∈ e) g(ȷ0d, a⃗ ) • ȷ1d wt B(a⃗). We
then haveΦ(e, λd.g(ȷ0d, a⃗ ) • ȷ1d) ≠ ∅ and
(∀y ∈ Φ(e, λd.g(ȷ0d, a⃗ ) • ȷ1d) y wt B(a⃗).
Using Lemma 3.4 we arrive at χB(a⃗,Φ(e, λd.g(ȷ0d, a⃗ ) • ȷ1d)) wt B(a⃗); whence
λe.χB(a⃗,Φ(e, λd.g(ȷ0d, a⃗ ) • ȷ1d)) wt ∃xA(x, a⃗)→ B(a⃗).
Next we show that every axiom of CZF− is realized by an E-recursive function. We treat the axioms one after the other.
(Extensionality): Since e wt ∀x(x ∈ a ↔ x ∈ b) implies a = b, and hence 0 wt a = b, it follows that
λu.0 wt [∀x(x ∈ a ↔ x ∈ b)→ a = b ].
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(Pair): There is an E-recursive function ℓ such that
ℓ(a, b, c) := {ȷ(0, a) | c = a} ∪ {ȷ(1, b) | c = b}.
We have ∀u ∈ {a, b} ℓ(a, b, u) wt (u = a ∨ u = b) and hence, letting c := {a, b},
λu.ℓ(a, b, u) wt ∀x ∈ c(x = u ∨ x = b).
We also have ȷ(0, 0) wt (a ∈ c ∧ b ∈ c), so that
ȷ(λu.ℓ(a, b, u), ȷ(0, 0)) wt ∀x ∈ c(x = a ∨ x = b) ∧ (a ∈ c ∧ b ∈ c).
Thus we arrive at
sg(ȷ(p(a, b), ȷ(λu.ℓ(a, b, u), ȷ(0, 0))) wt ∃y [∀x ∈ y(x = a ∨ x = b) ∧ (a ∈ y ∧ b ∈ y)].
(Union): Let ℓU be the E-recursive function defined by
ℓU(a, u) = {ȷ(x, ȷ(0, 0)) | x ∈ a ∧ u ∈ x}.
For u ∈ awe then have ℓU(a, u) wt ∃x ∈ a u ∈ x, and therefore
λu.ℓU(u, a) wt

∀u ∈

a

(∃x ∈ a) u ∈ x.
Obviously λu.λv.0 wt (∀x ∈ a)(∀y ∈ x) y ∈ a. Therefore we have
sg

ȷ

a, ȷ(λu.ℓU(u, a), λu.λv.0)

wt ∃w [(∀u ∈ w)(∃x ∈ a) u ∈ x ∧ (∀x ∈ a)(∀y ∈ x) y ∈ w].
(Empty Set): Obviously sg(ȷ(∅, λv.0)) wt ∃x (∀u ∈ x)u ≠ u.
(Binary Intersection): Let c := a ∩ b. As
λv.ȷ(0, 0) wt ∀x ∈ c (x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ b)
and λu.0 wt ∀x (x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ b → x ∈ c) hold, we conclude that
sg(ȷ(a ∩ b, ȷ(λv.ȷ(0, 0), λu.0))) wt ∃y [∀x ∈ y (x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ b) ∧ ∀x (x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ b → x ∈ y)].
(Set Induction): Suppose e wt ∀x[∀y(y ∈ x → A(y))→ A(x)]. Then, for all a,
e • a wt [∀y(y ∈ a → A(y))→ A(a)].
Suppose we have an index e∗ such that for all b ∈ a, e∗ • b wt A(b). As v wt b ∈ a entails b ∈ a, we get
λu.λv.e∗ • u wt ∀y(y ∈ a → A(y)),
and hence
(e • a) • (λu.λv.e∗ • u) wt A(a). (1)
By the recursion theorem we can effectively cook up an index q such that
(q • e) • a ≃ (e • a) • (λu.λv.(q • e) • u).
In view of the above it follows by set induction that for all a, (q • e) • a ↓ and (q • e) • a wt A(a). As a result we have
λw.(q • e) • w wt ∀x A(x), yielding
λeλw.(q • e) • w wt ∀x[∀y(y ∈ x → A(y))→ A(x)] → ∀x A(x).
(Strong Collection): Suppose
e wt ∀u(u ∈ a → ∃y B(u, y)). (2)
Then we have, for all b ∈ a, (e • b) • 0 wt ∃y B(b, y), and so (e • b) • 0 ≠ ∅ and
(∀d ∈ (e • b) • 0) ȷ1d wt B(b, ȷ0d). (3)
Let
C∗ := {ȷ0d | (∃x ∈ a)[d ∈ (e • x) • 0 ]}.
C∗ is a set in our background theory, using Replacement or Strong Collection.
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Now assume e′ wt b ∈ a. Then b ∈ a and hence, by the above, (e • b) • 0 ≠ ∅ and
(∀d ∈ (e • b) • 0) ȷ(0, ȷ1d) wt [ȷ0d ∈ C∗ ∧ B(b, ȷ0d)]. (4)
There is an E-recursive function ℓ2 defined by
ℓ2(e, b) ≃ {ȷ(ȷ0d, ȷ(0, ȷ1d)) | d ∈ (e • b) • 0}.
From (4) we can infer that ℓ2(e, b) wt ∃y [y ∈ C∗ ∧ B(b, y)] and hence, with the help of Corollary 3.3,
λu.λv.ℓ2(e, u) wt ∀x(x ∈ a → ∃y [y ∈ C∗ ∧ B(x, y)]). (5)
Now assume c ∈ C∗. Then there exist b ∈ a and d ∈ (e • b) • 0 such that c = ȷ0d. Moreover, by (3), whenever b ∈ a,
d ∈ (e • b) • 0 and ȷ0d = c , then ȷ1d wt B(b, c). Letting ℓ3 be the E-recursive function defined by
ℓ3(a, c, e) ≃ {ȷ(b, ȷ(0, ȷ1d)) | b ∈ a ∧ ∃d ∈ (e • b) • 0 ȷ0d = c},
we then have
ℓ3(a, c, e) wt ∃x(x ∈ a ∧ B(x, c)), (6)
thus, again with the help of Corollary 3.3,
λu.λv.ℓ3(a, u, e) wt ∀y[y ∈ C∗ → ∃x(x ∈ a ∧ B(x, y))]. (7)
Finally observe that there is an E-recursive function l such that
l(a, e) :=

ȷ0d | d ∈

x∈a
((e • x) • 0)

= {ȷ0d | (∃x ∈ a)[d ∈ (e • x) • 0 ]} = C∗.
Thus in view of (5) and (7) we arrive at
sg(ȷ(l(a, e), ȷ(λu.λv.ℓ2(e, u), λu.λv.ℓ3(a, u, e)))) wt ∃z [∀x(x ∈ a → ∃y [y ∈ z ∧ B(x, y)])
∧ ∀y[y ∈ z → ∃x(x ∈ a ∧ B(x, y))]].
As a result, λw.λq.sg(ȷ(l(w, q), ȷ(λu.λv.ℓ2(q, u), λu.λv.ℓ3(w, c, q)))) is a realizer for each instance of Strong Collection.
(Infinity): By [3, Lemma 9.2.2] it suffices to find a realizer for the formula
∃z ∀x(x ∈ z ↔ [x = ∅ ∨ ∃y ∈ z x = y ∪ {y}]).
Here x = ∅ is an abbreviation for ∀y(y ∈ x → y ≠ y) and (∃y ∈ z) x = y ∪ {y} is an abbreviation for
∃y(y ∈ z ∧ [∀w(w ∈ x → [w ∈ y ∨ w = y]) ∧ [∀w(w ∈ y → w ∈ x) ∧ y ∈ x ]]).
We have
λu′.λv′.0 wt ∀y(y ∈ ∅ → y ≠ y). (8)
For n+ 1 ∈ ω we have
ℓ4(n+ 1) wt ∀w(w ∈ n+ 1→ (w ∈ n ∨ w = n)) (9)
for the E-recursive function
ℓ4(u) := λw.λv′.{ȷ(0, 0) | w ∈ [pN](u)} ∪ {ȷ(1, 0) | w = [pN](u)}.
We also have ȷ(λw′.λv′.0, 0) wt ∀w(w ∈ n → w ∈ n+ 1) ∧ n ∈ n+ 1. Thus
ℓ5(n+ 1) wt n ∈ ω ∧ [∀w(w ∈ n+ 1→ (w ∈ n ∨ w = n)) ∧ [∀w(w ∈ n → w ∈ n+ 1) ∧ n ∈ n+ 1]]. (10)
with ℓ5(n+ 1) := ȷ(0, ȷ(ℓ4(n+ 1), ȷ(λw′.λv′.0, 0))). From (10) we conclude that
ℓ6(n+ 1) wt (∃y ∈ ω)(n+ 1 = y ∪ {y}), (11)
where ℓ6(m) := sg(ȷ([pN](m), ℓ5(m))). Now from (8) and (11) we conclude that for everym ∈ ω:
sg([dN](0,m, ȷ(0, λu′.λv′.0), ȷ(1, ℓ6(m)))) wt m = ∅ ∨ ∃y ∈ ωm = y ∪ {y}.
If e wt a ∈ ω then a ∈ ω, and hence with ℓ7(ω) := λu.sg([dN](0, u, ȷ(0, λu′.λv′.0), ȷ(1, ℓ6(u)))),
ℓ7(ω) wt (∀x ∈ ω)[x = ∅ ∨ ∃y ∈ ω x = y ∪ {y}]. (12)
Conversely, if e wt ∀y(y ∈ a → y ≠ y), then really ∀y ∈ a y ≠ y, and hence a = ∅, so that a ∈ ω. Also,
if e′ wt ∃y ∈ ω a = y ∪ {y} then by unravelling this definition it turns out that a ∈ ω holds. As a result, if
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d wt [a = ∅ ∨ ∃y ∈ ω a = y ∪ {y}] then there exists f ∈ d such that ȷ0f = 0 and ȷ1f wt a = ∅ or ȷ0f = 1 and
ȷ1f wt ∃y ∈ ω a = y ∪ {y}. In either case we have a ∈ ω, and so
λx.λe.0 wt ∀x([x = ∅ ∨ ∃y ∈ ω x = y ∪ {y}] → x ∈ ω). (13)
Combining (12) and (13), we have with h := sg(ȷ(ω, λv.ȷ(λd.(ℓ7(ω) • v), λe.0))) that
h wt ∃z ∀x(x ∈ z ↔ [x = ∅ ∨ ∃y ∈ z x = y ∪ {y}]).  (14)
Theorem 3.8. Let D(u1, . . . , ur) be a formula ofL∈ all of whose free variables are among u1, . . . , ur . If
CZFE ⊢ D(u1, . . . , ur),
then one can effectively construct an index of an Eexp-recursive function g such that
CZFE ⊢ ∀a1, . . . , ar g(a1, . . . , ar) εwt D(a1, . . . , ar).
Proof. We just have to extend the proof of Theorem 3.7 by finding a realizer for Exponentiation: It suffices to find a realizer
for the formula
∃y∀f (Fun(f , a, b)→ f ∈ y)
since realizability of the Exponentiation axiom follows then with the help of ∆0 Separation. Let c = exp(b, a). If e εwt
Fun(f , a, b) then, by Lemma 3.3, Fun(f , a, b) holds, and hence f ∈ c. Thus
λv.0 εwt ∀f (Fun(f , a, b)→ f ∈ c),
so that
sg(ȷ(exp(b, a), λv.0)) εwt ∃y(Fun(f , a, b)→ f ∈ y). 
Theorem 3.9. Let D(u1, . . . , ur) be a formula ofL∈ all of whose free variables are among u1, . . . , ur . If
CZFP ⊢ D(u1, . . . , ur),
then one can effectively construct an index of an E℘-recursive function g such that
CZFP ⊢ ∀a1, . . . , ar g(a1, . . . , ar) ℘wt D(a1, . . . , ar).
Proof. This is the same proof as for Theorem 3.7, except that we also have to take care of Powerset. It suffices to find a
realizer for the formula
∃y∀x(x ⊆ a → x ∈ y)
since realizability of the power set axiom follows then with the help of ∆0 Separation. e wt ∀u(u ∈ b → u ∈ a) implies
b ⊆ a and consequently b ∈ P (a). Therefore we have
λu.λv.0 wt ∀x[x ⊆ a → x ∈ P (a)],
thus sg(ȷ(P (a), λu.λv.0)) wt ∃y∀x[x ⊆ a → x ∈ y]. 
Theorem 3.10. CZF−, CZFE , and CZFP have the weak existence property. Indeed, they satisfy the stronger property uwEP.
Proof. Suppose
CZF− ⊢ ∀u ∃xD(u, x)
holds for a formula D(u, x) having at most the free variables u, x. According to Theorem 3.7, one can effectively construct an
index of an E-recursive function g such that
CZF− ⊢ ∀a g(a) wt ∃x D(a, x)
and hence
CZF− ⊢ ∀a [∃d d ∈ g(a) ∧ ∀d ∈ g(a) ȷ0d wt D(a, ȷ1d)].
In view of Corollary 3.3 we conclude that
CZF− ⊢ ∀a [∃d d ∈ g(a) ∧ ∀d ∈ g(a)D(a, ȷ1d)].
Letting C(a, y) be the formula y = {ȷ1d | d ∈ g(a)}we then have
CZF− ⊢ ∀u ∃!y C(u, y),
CZF− ⊢ ∀u∀y [C(u, y)→ ∃z z ∈ y],
CZF− ⊢ ∀u∀y [C(u, y)→ ∀x ∈ y D(u, x)],
as desired. The proofs for CZFE and CZFP are the same but use Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 3.9, respectively. 
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4. Conservativity over intuitionistic Kripke–Platek set theories
In this section we shall show that CZF−, CZFE and CZFP are conservative for restricted classes of formulae over their
intuitionistic Kripke–Platek counterparts.
4.1. Defining realizability with sets of witnesses (omitting truth)
We shall strip the definition of realizability given in Definition 3.1 of its truth component. This will enable us to establish
realizability interpretations in the pertaining Kripke–Platek versions.
Definition 4.1.
a w A iff A holds true, whenever A is an atomic formula
a w A ∧ B iff ȷ0a w A ∧ ȷ1a w B
a w A ∨ B iff a ≠ ∅ ∧ (∀d ∈ a)(

ȷ0d = 0 ∧ ȷ1d w A
 ∨ ȷ0d = 1 ∧ ȷ1d w B)
a w ¬A iff ∀c ¬c w A
a w A → B iff ∀c

c w A → a • c w B

a w (∀x ∈ b) A iff (∀c ∈ b) a • c w A[x/c]
a w (∃x ∈ b) A iff a ≠ ∅ ∧ (∀d ∈ a)[ȷ0d ∈ b ∧ ȷ1d w A[x/ȷ0d]
a w ∀xA iff ∀c a • c w A[x/c]
a w ∃xA iff a ≠ ∅ ∧ (∀d ∈ a) ȷ1d w A[x/ȷ0d]
w B iff ∃a a w B.
If we use indices of Eexp-recursive and E℘-recursive functions rather than E-recursive functions, we shall notate the
corresponding notion of realizability by a εw B and a 
℘
w B, respectively.
Theorem 4.2. Let D(u1, . . . , ur) be a formula ofL∈ all of whose free variables are among u1, . . . , ur .
(i) If CZF− ⊢ D(u1, . . . , ur), then one can effectively construct an index of an E-recursive function f such that IKP ⊢
∀a1, . . . , ar f (a1, . . . , ar) w D(a1, . . . , ar).
(ii) If CZFE ⊢ D(u1, . . . , ur), then one can effectively construct an index of an Eexp-recursive function g such that IKP(E) ⊢∀a1, . . . , ar g(a1, . . . , ar) εw D(a1, . . . , ar).
(iii) If CZFP ⊢ D(u1, . . . , ur), then one can effectively construct an index of an E℘-recursive function h such that IKP(P ) ⊢
∀a1, . . . , ar h(a1, . . . , ar) ℘w D(a1, . . . , ar).
Proof. This follows by the obvious simplifications of the proof of Theorem 3.7 
Definition 4.3. To each ∆0 formula D(x1, . . . , xr) of L∈ all of whose free variables are among x⃗ = x1, . . . , xr , we assign a
total E-recursive function kD of arity r as follows:
1. kD(x⃗) = {0} if D(x⃗) is atomic.
2. kD(x⃗) = {{⟨0, z⟩} | z ∈ kA(x⃗) ∧ A(x⃗)} ∪ {{⟨1, z⟩} | z ∈ kB(x⃗) ∧ B(x⃗)} if D(x⃗) is of the form A(x⃗) ∨ B(x⃗).
3. kD(x⃗) = {⟨z, w⟩ | z ∈ kA(x⃗) ∧ w ∈ kB(x⃗)} if D(x⃗) is of the form A(x⃗) ∧ B(x⃗).
4. kD(x⃗) = {λv.χB(x⃗, kB(x⃗))} if D(x⃗) is of the form A(x⃗) → B(x⃗).
5. kD(x⃗) = {{⟨z, v⟩} | z ∈ xi ∧ v ∈ kA(x⃗, z) ∧ A(x⃗, z)} if D(x⃗) is of the form ∃z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z).
6. kD(x⃗) = {λz.χA(x⃗, z, kA(x⃗, z))} if D(z⃗) is of the form ∀z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z).
To each∆P0 formula D(x1, . . . , xr)we assign a total E℘-recursive function k
℘
D of arity r by adding the following clauses to the
above:
7. k℘D (x⃗) = {{⟨z, ⟨λy.0, v⟩⟩} | z ∈ P (xi) ∧ v ∈ kA(x⃗, z) ∧ A(x⃗, z)} if D(x⃗) is of the form ∃z ⊆ xi A(x⃗, z).
8. k℘D (x⃗) = {λy.λz.χA(x⃗, z, kA(x⃗, z))} if D(z⃗) is of the form ∀z ⊆ xi A(x⃗, z).
Likewise, to each ∆E0 formula D(x1, . . . , xr) we assign a total Eexp-recursive function k
ε
D of arity r by adding the following
clauses to 1–6 above:
7′. kεD(x⃗) = {{⟨f , ⟨kF (f , x⃗), v⟩⟩} | f ∈ xixj ∧ v ∈ kA(x⃗, f ) ∧ A(x⃗, z)} if D(x⃗) is of the form ∃f ∈ xixj A(x⃗, f ) and F(f , x⃗) is the
formula f ∈ xixj.
8′. kεD(x⃗) = {λy.λf .χA(x⃗, f , kA(x⃗, f ))} if D(z⃗) is of the form ∀f ∈ xixj A(x⃗, f ).
For∆0-formulae realizability and truth coincide as the following Proposition shows.
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Proposition 4.4. Let D(x⃗) be a ∆0 formula whose free variables are among x⃗ = x1, . . . , xr . Then the following are provable in
IKP:
(i) D(x⃗) → kD(x⃗) ≠ ∅ ∧ ∀u ∈ kD(x⃗) u w D(x⃗).
(ii) (∃e e w D(x⃗)) → D(x⃗).
Proof. We show (i) and (ii) simultaneously by induction on the complexity of D.
1. For atomic D this is obvious.
2. Let D(x⃗) be of the form A(x⃗) ∨ B(x⃗). First suppose that D(x⃗) holds. Then the induction hypothesis entails that A(x⃗) and
kA(x⃗) ≠ ∅ or B(x⃗) and kB(x⃗) ≠ ∅. In every case we have kD(x⃗) ≠ ∅.
If u ∈ kD(x⃗) then either u = {⟨0, z⟩} and A(x⃗) for some z ∈ kA(x⃗) or u = {⟨1, z⟩} and B(x⃗) for some z ∈ kB(x⃗). In the first
case the inductive assumption yields z w A(x⃗) and hence u w D(x⃗). In the second case the inductive assumption yields
z w B(x⃗) and hence also u w D(x⃗). This shows (i).
As to (ii), suppose that e w D(x⃗). Then there exists u ∈ e such that u = ⟨0, d⟩ ∧ d w A(x⃗) or u = ⟨1, d⟩ ∧ d w B(x⃗)
for some d. The induction hypothesis yields A(x⃗) or B(x⃗), thus D(x⃗).
3. Let D(x⃗) be of the form A(x⃗) ∧ B(x⃗). Then (i) and (ii) are immediate by the induction hypothesis.
4. Let D(x⃗) be of the form A(x⃗) → B(x⃗). By definition, kD(x⃗) = {λv.χB(x⃗, kB(x⃗))} ≠ ∅. As to (i), assume that D(x⃗) holds and
e w A(x⃗). The induction hypothesis (ii) applied to A(x⃗) yields that A(x⃗) holds, which implies that B(x⃗) holds. The induction
hypothesis (i) for the latter formula yields that kB(x⃗) ≠ ∅ and ∀u ∈ kB(x⃗) u w B(x⃗). An application of Lemma 3.4 thus yields
χB(x⃗, kB(x⃗)) w B(x⃗). As a result, λv.χB(x⃗, kB(x⃗)) w D(x⃗) confirming (i).
For (ii), suppose e w (A(x⃗)→ B(x⃗)) and A(x⃗) holds. By the induction hypothesis (i) for the latter formula, kA(x⃗) ≠ ∅ and
∀u ∈ kA(x⃗) u w A(x⃗). Thus, picking u0 ∈ kA(x⃗)we have e • u0 w B(x⃗), and hence the induction hypothesis (ii) for the latter
formula yields that B(x⃗) holds.
5. Let D(x⃗) be of the form ∃z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z). To verify (i), suppose ∃z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z) holds. Then there is z ∈ xi such that A(x⃗, z).
The induction hypothesis (i) for the latter formula yields that kA(x⃗, z) ≠ ∅, and hence kD(x⃗) ≠ ∅. Now suppose u ∈ kD(x⃗).
Then u = {⟨z, v⟩} for some z ∈ xi and v ∈ kA(x⃗, z). As A(x⃗, z) holds, the induction hypothesis (i) yields that v w A(x⃗, z),
whence u w ∃z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z).
For (ii), assume e w ∃z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z). Then e ≠ ∅. Picking d ∈ e we have ȷ0d ∈ xi and ȷ1d w A(x⃗, ȷ0d), thus A(x⃗, ȷ0d) by
the induction hypothesis (ii), thence ∃z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z) holds.
6. Let D(x⃗) be of the form ∀z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z). To verify (i), suppose ∀z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z) is true. By definition, kD(x⃗) =
{λz.χA(x⃗, z, kA(x⃗, z))} ≠ ∅. If z0 ∈ xi we have A(x⃗, z0), so that inductively kA(x⃗, z0) ≠ ∅ and ∀d ∈ kA(x⃗, z0) d w A(x⃗, z0).
Whence, by Lemma 3.4, χA(x⃗, z0, kA(x⃗, z0)) w A(z⃗, z0). As a result, λz.χA(x⃗, z, kA(x⃗, z)) w D(x⃗).
As for (ii), suppose e w ∀z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z). Thus e • z w A(x⃗, z) for all z ∈ xi, so that inductively ∀z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z) holds. 
Proposition 4.5. Let D(x⃗) be a ∆P0 formula whose free variables are among x⃗ = x1, . . . , xr . Then the following are provable in
IKP(P ):
(i) D(x⃗) → k℘D (x⃗) ≠ ∅ ∧ ∀u ∈ k℘D (x⃗) u ℘w D(x⃗).
(ii) (∃e e ℘w D(x⃗)) → D(x⃗).
Proof. In addition to the previous proof we have to consider two more cases.
7. Let D(x⃗) be of the form ∃z ⊆ xi A(x⃗, z). To verify (i), suppose ∃z ⊆ xi A(x⃗, z) holds. Then there is z ∈ P (xi) such that
A(x⃗, z). The induction hypothesis (i) for the latter formula yields that k℘A (x⃗, z) ≠ ∅, and hence k℘D (x⃗) ≠ ∅. Now suppose
u ∈ k℘D (x⃗). Then u = {⟨z, ⟨λy.0, v⟩⟩} for some z ⊆ xi and v ∈ k℘A (x⃗, z). As A(x⃗, z) holds the induction hypothesis (i) yields
that v ℘w A(x⃗, z). Also λy.0 
℘
w z ⊆ xi. Whence u ℘w ∃z (z ⊆ xi ∧ A(x⃗, z)).
For (ii), assume e ℘w ∃z [z ⊆ xi ∧ A(x⃗, z)]. Then e ≠ ∅. Picking d ∈ ewe have ȷ1d ℘w [ȷ0d ⊆ xi ∧ A(x⃗, ȷ0d)]. This entails
ȷ0d ⊆ xi and ȷ1(ȷ1d) ℘w A(x⃗, ȷ0d). Thus A(x⃗, ȷ0d) by the induction hypothesis (ii), thence ∃z ⊆ xi A(x⃗, z) holds.
8. Let D(x⃗) be of the form ∀z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z). To verify (i), suppose ∀z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z) is true. By definition, k℘D (x⃗) =
{λy.λz.χA(x⃗, z, k℘A (x⃗, z))} ≠ ∅. If y ℘w z0 ⊆ xi, then z0 ⊆ xi holds and we have A(x⃗, z0), so that inductively k℘A (x⃗, z0) ≠ ∅ and
∀d ∈ kA(x⃗, z0) d ℘w A(x⃗, z0). Whence, by Lemma 3.4, χA(x⃗, z0, k℘A (x⃗, z0)) ℘w A(z⃗, z0). As a result, λy.λz.χA(x⃗, z, k℘A (x⃗, z)) ℘w
D(x⃗).
As for (ii), suppose e ℘w ∀z ⊆ xi A(x⃗, z). Thus e • z ℘w [z ⊆ xi → A(x⃗, z)] for all z. If z ⊆ xi, then λy.0 ℘w z ⊆ xi, so that
(e • z) • (λy.0) ℘w A(x⃗, z), and therefore, by the inductive assumption, A(x⃗, z) holds. As a result, ∀z ∈ xi A(x⃗, z) holds. 
Proposition 4.6. Let D(x⃗) be a ∆E0 formula whose free variables are among x⃗ = x1, . . . , xr . Then the following are provable in
IKP(E):
(i) D(x⃗) → kεD(x⃗) ≠ ∅ ∧ ∀u ∈ kεD(x⃗) u εw D(x⃗).
(ii) (∃e e εw D(x⃗)) → D(x⃗).
Proof. This can be proved in the same vein as Proposition 4.5. 
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Definition 4.7. We say that a formula D is Π2, ΠE2 , or Π
P
2 if it is of the form ∀x ∃y A(x⃗, y⃗) with A(x⃗, y⃗) being, respectively,
∆0,∆E0 , and∆
P
0 .
Theorem 4.8. (i) CZF− is conservative over IKP forΠ2 sentences.
(ii) CZFE is conservative over IKP(E) forΠE2 sentences.
(iii) CZFP is conservative over IKP(P ) forΠP2 sentences.
Proof. (i) Suppose
CZF− ⊢ ∀x∃y A(x, y)
with A(x, y)∆0. By Theorem 4.2 there is an E-recursive function f such that IKP ⊢ ∀x f (x) w ∃y A(x, y). Then
IKP ⊢ ∀x [f (x) ≠ ∅ ∧ ∀e ∈ f (x) (ȷ1e w A(x, ȷ0e)].
By Proposition 4.4 we get
IKP ⊢ ∀x [f (x) ≠ ∅ ∧ ∀e ∈ f (x) A(x, ȷ0e)]
which entails IKP ⊢ ∀x ∃y A(x, y).
The proofs for (ii) and (iii) are similar. 
5. Targeting the existence property
The previous sections provide much more information than has been made explicit. Let T be one of the theories CZF−,
CZFE , or CZFP . The question of whether T has the existence property can be reduced to the more manageable question of
whether the Kripke–Platek version of T has the EP forΣ ,ΣP , andΣE existential theorems, respectively.
Definition 5.1. LetΞ be a collection of formulae. A theory T has the EP forΞ if whenever T ⊢ ∃xA(x) for a sentence ∃xA(x)
with A(x) inΞ , then there exists a formula C(x) inΞ (with at most x free) such that
T ⊢ ∃!x [C(x) ∧ A(x)].
Theorem 5.2. If IKP has the EP forΣ formulae then CZF− has the EP.
Proof. Assume that IKP has the EP forΣ formulae. Suppose that
CZF− ⊢ ∃yB(y) (15)
with ∃yB(y) a closed formula. It then follows that we can explicitly construct the index of an E-recursive function f such
that
CZF− ⊢ f (0) ↓ ∧ f (0) wt ∃yB(y).
Hence, letting C(x) stand for ∀z ∈ x∃u ∈ f (0) z = ȷ0u ∧ ∀u ∈ f (0) ȷ0u ∈ xwe arrive at
CZF− ⊢ ∃!x C(x) ∧ ∀x [C(x)→ ∃u u ∈ x] ∧ ∀x[C(x)→ ∀y ∈ x B(y)]. (16)
In particular we have CZF− ⊢ ∃y ∃x [C(x) ∧ y ∈ x]. Let D be the closed formula ∃y ∃x [C(x) ∧ y ∈ x]. D is aΣ formula. Using
Σ-reflection (see [2, Theorem 11.4]) we have
IKP ⊢ D ↔ ∃a Da (17)
where Da arises from D by restricting all unbounded (existential) quantifiers in D by a. Thus CZF− ⊢ ∃a Da and therefore,
owing toΣ1 conservativity, IKP ⊢ ∃a Da, whence
IKP ⊢ ∃y ∃x [C(x) ∧ y ∈ x]. (18)
Since we assumed that IKP has the EP forΣ formulae, there exists aΣ formula F(y) such that
IKP ⊢ ∃!y (F(y) ∧ ∃x [C(x) ∧ y ∈ x]),
so that
CZF− ⊢ ∃!y (F(y) ∧ ∃x [C(x) ∧ y ∈ x]). (19)
Combining (16) and (19) we have
CZF− ⊢ ∃!y (F(y) ∧ ∃x [C(x) ∧ y ∈ x] ∧ B(y)). 
Theorem 5.3. (i) If IKP(E) has the EP forΣE formulae then CZFE has the EP.
(i) If IKP(P ) has the EP forΣP formulae then CZFP has the EP.
Proof. This is similar to the previous one. 
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6. A proof sketch that IKP has the existence property forΣ formulae
To show this we use a much more elaborate technology than realizability. It is possible to carry out an ordinal analysis
of IKP just as for KP as in [31]. It involves a term structure built from the backbone of an ordinal representation system that
mimics the constructible hierarchy. For every theoremΣ theoremof IKP of the form ∃xA(x) one can effectively determine an
ordinal α from the representation system (which is smaller than the Bachmann–Howard ordinal) and an infinitary cut-free
derivationD α
0
∃ xA(x). Since this is a derivation in infinitary intuitionistic logic one obtains from the proof an explicit term
t in the term structure and a proofD ′ α
0
A (t). The canonical interpretation of t in the constructible hierarchy as defined in
[31, 3.5 Soundness Theorem] then provides the explicit witness for ∃xA(x). As the entire reasoning can be carried out in IKP
this entails that IKP has the EP forΣ formulae.
Corollary 6.1. CZF− has the EP.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 5.2 and the foregoing considerations. 
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